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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The sole question presented by the Petition for Writ of
Certiorari is whether the petitioners have demonstrated any
special and important reasons that would justify review of the
Court of Appeals' decision.

As demonstrated herein, there are no

such special and important reasons.

The Court of Appeals

correctly ruled that:
(a)

The trial court failed to apply the correct measure of

damages to the established facts, and
(b)

The attorneys7 fee provisions in this case provided for

an award of attorneys' fees to Golwix Properties1 but did not
contain a "prevailing party" provision that would provide the
basis for any award of attorneys' fees to Stacey.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves a real estate transaction in which Golwix
has been cittempting to enforce its contractual rights against
Stacey for nearly five years.

Golwix has proven that Stacey

blatantly breached several warranties and covenants contained in
the Agreement between the parties, yet Stacey continues to delay
the resolution of this case.

Stacey's petition to this court is

simply another attempt to prolong this matter and prevent Golwix
from receiving the recovery to which it is entitled.

Respondents operate their real estate investment business
under the name of Golwix Properties. For clarity and
convenience, this brief will refer to respondents as "Golwix
Properties" or simply "Golwix".
1

Stacey's so called "Statement of Facts Relevant to this
Petition" mischaracterizes rulings of the District Court and the
Court of Appeals, misstates facts, and contains numerous
allegations that are completely irrelevant to the questions
presented by the petition.

Stacey's obvious intent is to cloud

the record in an effort to convince this court that factual
questions were reviewed by the Court of Appeals.

The Court of

Appeals, however, did not review or disturb any factual findings
but merely ruled on questions of law.

A correct summary of the

facts relevant to the petition is nevertheless necessary for this
court to understand that this is not an appropriate case for
certiorari review.
On May 22, 1984 Golwix Properties entered into a letter
agreement (the "Agreement")2 with Stacey to purchase certain
commercial properties.

(Findings and Conclusions «[ 1, R-496.) 3

As partial payment for the properties, Golwix executed a
promissory note (the "Note") on the same date.
R-496.) A

(Id. f 2,

The terms of the Note provided offset rights to Golwix

to ensure performance by Stacey of the warranties and covenants
contained in the Agreement.

2

The Agreement is included in the addendum to this brief as
Exhibit "A".
3

The District Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law are included in the addendum to this brief as Exhibit "B".
Citations to the record are given in the form of "R-" and the
page number. For clarity, citations to the Transcript on Appeal
are distinguished by the designation "TR-" and the page number.
4

The Note is included in the addendum as Exhibit "C".
2

Shortly after Golwix took possession of the properties, a
large air-conditioning unit at one of the properties was found to
be inoperable.

(Id. tf ll.a(l) and (4) R-499.)

The trial court

made specific factual findings that the air-conditioning unit was
not in working order and operative on the date of the closing of
the transaction in breach of the terms of the Agreement.
13.a(l), R-502.)

(Id. %

The trial court further found that Stacey had

failed to make repairs to the unit after being notified that the
unit was inoperable (id. t ll.a(4), R-499), and that Golwix
Properties incurred an expense of $22,758 to replace the unit
(id. 1 ll.a(5), R-499).
The evidence presented at trial indicated that soon after
the closing Golwix was notified that the air conditioner was not
functioning.

Golwix quickly responded to the problem by sending

air-conditioning specialists to investigate.

(TR-170-71.)

The

specialists inspected the unit and attempted repairs.
(TR-171-76.)

The repairs were unsuccessful, however, because

repeated leaks in the condenser coil over the years had resulted
in serious damage to the compressor unit and other parts of the
system.

(TR-208-10.)

Golwix's air-conditioning expert testified

that he investigated the cost of repairing the unit to make it
operative and estimated such cost to be $19,000 to $2 0,000.
(TR-211.)

Because the repair cost nearly equalled the cost of a

new unit, replacement was the most reasonable and prudent course
of action.

(TR-215.)

Consequently, Golwix reasonably incurred

the actual cost of $22,750 to replace the unit.
3

(Findings and

Conclusions % ll.a(5), R-499.)

The trial court, however, only

awarded damages in the amount of $5,689.50 with respect to the
air conditioner, reasoning that "the unit would have had
approximately 25% of its useful life remaining under normal
conditions."

(Id. % 11.a(3) , R-499.)

Golwix was awarded damages on its other counterclaims in
addition to the air-conditioning unit damages.

Because the total

damage award exceeded the total of the unpaid installments under
the Note (jld. 1 6, R-497) , the trial court refused to accelerate
the Note and the Complaint was dismissed for no cause of action
(Judgment % 4 ) . 5
The trial court refused to consider the application for
costs and attorneys' fees by any party.

Stacey was denied costs

and fees because it did not prevail on its Complaint.
and Conclusions % 20, R-506.)

(Findings

The trial court concluded that

Golwix "would be entitled to an award of attorneys7 fees if [it]
had simply defended the case successfully, but [is] not entitled
to an award of fees because [it] did not prevail on many of its
counterclaims."

(Id. % 21, R-506.)

Stacey appealed the judgment of the trial court and Golwix
Properties filed a cross appeal.

The appeal was transferred by

this court to the Court of Appeals for disposition.

The Court of

Appeals ruled that (1) the trial court had properly determined
that the Promissory Note could not be accelerated; (2) the trial

3

A copy of the Judgment is included in the addendum as
Exhibit "D".
4

court had applied an incorrect measure of damages regarding
Golwix's counterclaim for the air-conditioning unit; (3) Stacey
was not entitled to an award of attorneys' fees because it did
not prevail on its Complaint for acceleration; and (4) Golwix was
entitled to attorneys' fees for the claims on which it was
successful under the terms of the Agreement between the parties.6
ARGUMENT
PETITIONERS HAVE FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THE EXISTENCE OF ANY
SPECIAL AND IMPORTANT REASONS THAT WOULD JUSTIFY THE
EXTRAORDINARY GRANT OF A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Rule 4 3 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court (which was
added effective April 20, 1987), sets forth the considerations
governing review by a Writ of Certiorari:
Review by a Writ of Certiorari is not a matter of
right, but of judicial discretion, and will be granted
only when there are special and important reasons
therefor. The following, while neither controlling nor
wholly measuring the court's discretion, indicate the
charcicter of reasons that will be considered:
(1) When a panel of the Court of Appeals
has rendered a decision in conflict
with a decision of another panel of the
Court of Appeals on the same issue of
law;
(2) When a panel of the Court of Appeals
has decided a question of state or
federal law in a way that is in
conflict with a decision of this
court;. . . .
R. Utah S. Ct. Rule 43 (emphasis added).
This court has not taken the opportunity to elaborate on the
considerations set forth in Rule 4 3 so it is useful to review

6

The opinion of the Court of Appeals is included in the
addendum to this brief as Exhibit "E".
5

decisions interpreting the comparable federal provisions.
Shortly after passage of the federal statutory writ of
certiorari, the United States Supreme Court established the
foundations of certiorari doctrine:
While this power is coextensive with all possible
necessities and sufficient to secure to this court a
final control over the litigation in all the Courts of
Appeal, it is a power which will be sparingly
exercised, and only when the circumstances of the case
satisfy us that the importance of the question
involved, the necessity of avoiding conflict between
two or more courts of appeal, or between courts of
appeal and the courts of a state, or some matter
affecting the interests of this nation in its internal
or external relations, demands such exercise,
Forsyth v. Hammond. 166 U.S. 506, 515 (1897) (emphasis added).
The limited exercise of discretion described by the United States
Supreme Court serves important public and institutional policies
that are just as applicable to the Utah Supreme Court.
Widespread certiorari review undermines the finality and
reliability of decisions rendered by the Court of Appeals.
Moreover, broad review would defeat the institutional policy of
rationing the limited resources of the Supreme Court.

As noted

by Professors Wright & Miller,
In most circumstances, the Supreme Court exercises its
discretion on the assumption that it cannot function as
an ordinary appellate court concerned with achieving
individual justice in individual cases. . . .
As the
number of cases seeking review has grown, the docket
has had to be devoted more and more to constitutional
and statutory questions that are likely to have
widespread general impact.
16 C. Wright, A. Miller, E. Cooper & E. Gressman, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 4004, at 507-08 (1977).

6

The Petition for a Writ of Certiorari in this case runs
directly contrary to the policies that underlie discretionary
review and the role of this court.

Stacey has not presented this

court with any issues of widespread general impact that would
justify the expenditure of this court's precious resources.
Indeed, a grant of the petition would simply undermine the
credibility and usefulness of the Court of Appeals as an
important part of this state's judicial system.
The simple fact is that Stacey is unhappy with the Court of
Appeals' decision and has attempted to contrive reasons for this
court to exercise its discretion to grant review.

As

demonstrated below, however, this case involves issues of narrow
application which were correctly decided by the Court of Appeals
in a manner fully consistent with Utah law.
A.

The Court of Appeals Carefully Followed the Prior Decisions
of this Court in Ruling that the District Court Applied an
Incorrect Measure of Damages.
Stacey first contends that the Court of Appeals erred by

purportedly disturbing the trial court's factual findings
regarding Golwix's counterclaim for the air-conditioning unit.
After starting with the false premise that factual determinations
are at issue, Stacey goes on to argue that the Court of Appeals'
ruling is in conflict with prior decisions of this court which
constrain an appellate court from disturbing a trial court's fact
findings.

The technique of Stacey's argument is nothing more

than setting up a straw man and knocking the straw man down.

The

Court of Appeals did not question, address, or disturb any of the
7

trial court's fact findings regarding damages.

Rather, the Court

of Appeals reviewed the measure of damages applied by the
District Court and concluded, as a matter of law, that the
proportionate award of damages with respect to the air
conditioner was the incorrect legal standard.
With respect to the damages issue, the Court of Appeals
reasoned as follows:
Damages recoverable in a breach of contract action are
generally "those which arise naturally from the breach
and which reasonably may be supposed to have been within
the contemplation of the parties or are reasonably
foreseeable." Robbins v. Finlay, 645 P.2d 623, 625 (Utah
1982). "Damages are properly measured by the amount
necessary to place the nonbreaching party in as good a
position as if the contract had been performed."
Alexander v. Brown, 646 P.2d 692, 695 (Utah 1982).
The trial court likewise apportioned the actual
replacement cost of the air conditioner. Golwix was
awarded twenty-five percent of the replacement cost of
$22,758, or $5,689.50. The court held that Golwix would
"receive a windfall" if Stacey was held responsible for
the full replacement cost. The award, however, fails to
"place the nonbreaching party in as good a position as if
the contract had been performed." Alexander, 646 P.2d at
695. Golwix contracted for a cooling system that was to
be operable on the day of closing. What it received was
an air conditioner that was not in working order on that
date. Since the evidence indicates that the reasonable
cost of repairing the unit would have been between
$19,000 and $20,000, the court's award was insufficient
to afford Golwix the benefit of its bargain. For that
reason, the award for the air conditioner should be
increased, on remand, to reflect the reasonable cost of
repair.
(Court of Appeals decision at 5.)
Thus, the Court of Appeals' decision did not involve any
assessment of the weight of the evidence, the credibility of the
witnesses, or the reversal of any factual determination.

8

The

court merely determined that the trial court had not applied the
measure of damages required by the decisions of this court.

The

cases cited by Stacey concerning the appellate court's limited
review of factual determinations are, therefore, inapplicable.7
This court has observed that:
The determination of the trial court on damages will not
be reversed if it is supported by substantial evidence in
the record. We will, however, reverse a trial court if
there is a misapplication of the law to the established
facts.
Bitzes v. Sunset Oaks, Inc., 649 P.2d 66, 71 (Utah 1982)
(emphasis added).

The uncontroverted evidence at trial

demonstrated that Golwix was forced to incur the actual cost of
$22,758 to replace an air-conditioning unit that could not have
been made operative without incurring a repair cost of $19,000 to
$20,000.

(Findings and Conclusions «[ ll.a(5), R-499; TR-211-12;

TR-215.)

Of course, Golwix selected the only economically

reasonable alternative and replaced the unit for slightly more
than the necessary repair cost.

Those facts were established.

7

The cases cited by Stacey as purportedly inconsistent with
the Court of Appeals decision here are not inconsistent at all.
See, e.g. , Mabey v. Kay Peterson Construction, Inc., 682 P.2d 287
(Utah 1984) (holding that damage award may be set aside if "the
trial court neglected pertinent elements"; the measure of damages
was not at issue); Baker v. Hansen, 666 P.2d 315 (Utah 1983)
(reviewing whether substantial evidence supported the damage
award; the measure of damages was not at issue); Clayton v.
Crossroads Equipment Co., 655 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1982) (court
reviewed the measure of damages and concluded that the proper
measure had been applied; two justices dissented on the grounds
that the trial court had applied the wrong damage measure);
Arnold Machinery Co. v. Intrusion Prepakt, Inc., 11 Utah 2d 246,
357 P.2d 496 (1960) (stating that jury was not required to accept
certain evidence of damages; the court did not even consider the
issue of whether the correct measure of damages was used).
9

The Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the District Court
misapplied the law concerning the correct measure of damages to
those established facts.

An award of a percentage of the cost of

the new unit failed to put Golwix in as good a position as if the
contract had been performed, i.e. having an air-conditioning unit
that was in working order and operative.

The Court of Appeals'

decision was, therefore, correct and in no way departs from any
of the decisions of this court.
B.

The Court of Appeals' Interpretation of the Specific
Contractual Provisions Governing Attorneys' Fees in this Case
is Fully Consistent with other Case Law.
1.

Stacev was not Entitled to Recover its Attorneys' Fees
because the Note does not Contain a "Prevailing Party"
Provision.

Stacey contends that the Court of Appeals' construction of
the attorneys' fee provision contained in the Note was wrong.
The relevant provision of the Note provides as follows:
Makers agree to pay any and all costs and expenses
(regardless of the particular nature thereof and whether
incurred with or without suit or before or after
judgment, including reasonable attorneys' fees) which may
be incurred by or in connection with the enforcement or
performance of any of the rights of Properties
hereunder. . . .
(Promissory Note at 2 (emphasis added).)

The trial court

concluded that "Plaintiff did not prevail on its complaint for
acceleration and is therefore not entitled to an award of
attorneys' fees."

(Findings and Conclusions % 2 0.)

The Court of

Appeals agreed with that conclusion, ruling as follows:
We consider this finding to be in accord with the
language of the note, i.e., Golwix will pay attorneys'
fees in connection with the enforcement of Stacey's
rights under the note. Since Stacey's attempt to
10

accelerate the note was unsuccessful, Stacey was properly
denied its attorneys' fees."
(Court of Appeals opinion at 6.)
Stacey argues that the language of the Note entitled Stacey
to receive a percentage of its attorneys' fees incurred in
successfully defending against some of the counterclaims of
Golwix.
Appeals.

That argument was properly rejected by the Court of
This court consistently has held that attorneys' fees

may be recovered only where there is a specific statutory or
contractual basis for such an award.

See, e.g., Espinoza v.

Safeco Title Insurance Co., 598 P.2d 346, 348 (Utah 1979).
Attorneys' fees awarded pursuant to a contract can be allowed
"only in accordance with the terms of the contract."

Turtle

Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 671
(Utah 1982).

The terms of the Note do not permit recovery of

attorneys' fees where Stacey has not prevailed in enforcing the
right of acceleration under the Note.

The only right under the

Note that Stacey sought to enforce by way of its complaint was
the right to acceleration upon default.

Having failed on that

issue, Stacey is not entitled to any award of fees.
Stacey's argument and the cases cited by Stacey in support of
its argument for an award of attorneys' fees would apply if the
Note or the Agreement included a "prevailing party" attorneys'
fee provision.

Such a provision, however, does not exist here.

This court has repeatedly refused to construe attorneys' fee
provisions to award fees to a prevailing party absent express

11

language setting forth such a requirement.

See, e.g., Falkner v.

Farnsworth, 714 P.2d 1149 (Utah 1986) (refusing to apply cases
interpreting "prevailing party77 language to a contract awarding
fees against a

77

defaulting party77) .

In Trayner v. Cushing, 688

P.2d 856 (Utah 1984), a case cited by Stacey in its petition,
this court held that

77

a party is entitled only to those fees

attributable to the successful vindication of contractual rights
within the terms of their agreement.7/
added).

Id. at 858 (emphasis

In the Trayner case, both parties argued that they were

entitled to attorneys7 fees and cited several cases referring to
attorneys7 fees provisions.

This court stated as follows:

Counsel for both parties cite and discuss cases awarding
attorneys7 fees to the 77prevailing party77 or to the party
77
not in default77. Neither of these phrases was used in
the agreement before us. These parties have agreed
instead to the payment of attorneys7 fees in an action
brought to "enforce77 the agreement "or any right arising
out of the breach thereof77.
Id. at 858.
The Court of Appeals carefully followed the prior decisions
of this court by applying the language contained in the Note and
not by inferring a "prevailing party" provision as urged by
Stacey.
2.

Golwix was Entitled to an Award of Attorneys7 Fees for
Successfully Enforcing its Rights as Provided by the
Agreement.

The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court erred in
failing to award attorneys7 fees to Golwix for successfully
vindicating its rights under the Agreement.

Stacey argues that

the Court of Appeals 7 decision in this regard was wrong because
12

the applicable section of the Agreement is entitled "Indemnity".
From that label, Stacey makes an illogical and enormous leap in
reasoning to conclude that the label renders invalid the language
of the provision and limits any recovery of attorneys7 fees to
instances where Golwix may be defending against claims asserted
by third parties.

This leap in reasoning cannot be used as a

basis for any conclusion that special and important reasons exist
to warrant certiorari review*
Stacey 7 s arguments are belied by the plain language of the
Agreement which Stacey carefully avoids quoting.

Section 17 of

the Agreement contains a broad attorneys7 fee provision:
[Stacey] agree[s] to indemnify . . . and reimburse you
. . . for . . . any claim, liability, obligation, loss,
damage, deficiency, assessment, judgment, cost, or
expense (including without limitation reasonable
attorneys7 fees and expenses, and costs and expenses
reasonably incurred, in investigating, preparing, or
defending against any litigation or claim), . . . arising
out of or in any manner incident, relating or
attributable to:
a. any breach or failure of any
representation or warranty given by us . . .;
b. any failure of either of us to perform or
observe, or to have performed or observed, in
full, any covenant, agreement, or condition to be
performed or observed by us under this agreement
. . .; or
d. the enforcement of your rights under this
agreement.
As observed by the Court of Appeals, this language "is
expansively written, encompassing a broad range of potential
expenses connected with rights arising under the contract."
(Court of Appeals7 opinion at 7.)

Thus, the label "indemnity"

does not limit the obligation to reimburse attorneys7 fees and

13

costs to those instances where claims are asserted by third
parties.

Rather, the language requires Stacey to indemnify and

reimburse Golwix for attorneys7 fees and costs incurred in
enforcing all of its rights under the Agreement regardless of the
source of the loss.

If the parties had intended to limit the

scope of the Agreement to claims asserted by third parties, they
certainly could have stated that intention.

However, the parties

expressly agreed that Stacey would indemnify and reimburse Golwix
for attorneys7 fees incurred in

7/

anv litigation77 in which Golwix

enforces its rights under the Agreement.
Stacey further attempts to convince this court that the Court
of Appeals 7 decision is inconsistent with Utah law regarding the
law of indemnification by citing cases involving common law
claims for implied indemnification.

Stacey cites Perry v.

Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 214 (Utah 1984), for the
proposition that a claim for indemnification is different than a
claim for breach of contract or warranty, and further cites
Hanover Ltd. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 758 P.2d 443 (Utah App.
1988), for the rule that an indemnitee cannot recover attorneys7
fees incurred in establishing its right to indemnity.

Those

cases and the other indemnity cases cited by Stacey, however, are
inapposite.
The cases cited by Stacey pertain to common law causes of
action for implied indemnity.

None of Stacey 7 s cases concern

contractual indemnity or the interpretation of a contractual
indemnification provision.

The law governing implied

14

indemnification or the right to recover attorneys' fees for
enforcing implied indemnification rights have no application
where a specific contractual agreement between the parties
establishes such rights.
Parties may make a contractual indemnification provision as
broad as they desire.

Indeed, common law rules of

indemnification are abrogated or superceded in an action based on
an indemnity contract.

See, e.g., Juneau v. Alaska Electric

Light & Power Co., 622 P.2d 954, 956 (Alaska 1981); Rossmoor
Sanitation v. Pylon, Inc., 119 Cal. Rptr. 449, 532 P.2d 97
(1975).

A contract of indemnification is subject to the same

rules of construction applicable to all contracts.

See, e.g.f

Chetopa State Bancshares, Inc. v. Fox, 6 Kan. App. 2d 326, 628
P.2d 249 (1981); 41 Am. Jur. 2d Indemnity § 6, at 691 (1968).
The Court of Appeals' construction of the specific provision
at issue in this case was absolutely correct.

The provision

plainly requires Stacey to pay Golwix's attorneys' fees incurred
in enforcing its rights under the Agreement regardless of the
source of the claim or the nature of the attorneys' fees.

The

Court of Appeals properly looked to the terms of the Agreement
between the parties in concluding that Golwix was entitled to
recover the attorneys' fees incurred in successfully vindicating
its rights under the Agreement.
CONCLUSION
No special and important reasons exist in this case for this
court to grant a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari.
15

Not only was

the decision of the Court of Appeals correct, the decision does
not conflict in any way with prior decisions of this court or
with decisions from another panel of the Court of Appeals.
Furthermore, the case does not involve any issues of widespread
and significant importance that would justify the expenditure of
this court's limited resources.

Rather, the case concerns the

interpretation of specific contractual provisions that are unique
to this case.

Any further review would only serve to undermine

the importance of the Court of Appeals and the finality of its
decisions.

For the foregoing reasons, Golwix Properties

respectfully submits that the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
*

must be denied.
DATED this

gr

day of April, 1989.
KIMBALL, PARR, CROCKETT & WADDOUPS

By:

V] )\J vv^

Ronald/G. Russell,
Attorneys for Defendants
and Counterclaimants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the ^)--^ctay of April, 1989 a true
and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION
FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI was mailed, postage prepaid, to:
Robert M. Anderson, Esq.
William P. Schwartz, Esq.
HANSEN & ANDERSON
Valley Tower Building
50 West Broadway, Sixth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 8 4 1 0 1 ^
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May 1, 1984

Mr. Ben Wixen
Ms. Francine A. Wixen
Dr. Bernie Goler
Ms. Bonnie Goler
1911 South Commerce Center, B.
Suite 211
San Bernadino, California 92408
Dear Mr. and Ms. Wixen and Dr. and Ms. Goler:
This letter is written to set forth the terms of our
agreement this date relating to the sale by Stacey Properties,
a Utah Limited Partnership, and me to you as tenants in common.
1.

Property Sold

The properties to be sold include the following:
a.
1-18, inclusive.

Commonwealth Square Shopping Center, Units

b.

Pizza Hut, Ogden, Utah.

c.

Eastern Winds Restaurant, Ogden, Utah.

d.

Jiffy Lube Center, Ogden, Utah

e.

Post Office Building, Ogden, Utah.

All of the said properties are more fully described in
Exhibit "A" attached hereto. The properties have been
inspected by you and are purchased "as is". Said buildings
vary from the plans, specifications and building contracts
being delivered to you only as set forth on Exhibit B attached
hereto and in other minor ways which do not materially affect
the said properties. We agree to remedy any latent defects in

EXHIBIT "A"
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materials or workmanship which arise within a one year period
from the date of closing. We represent and warrant to you that
all heating, cooling, electrical, plumbing and sewer systems at
the properties are in working order and will be operative at
closing and that the footings and foundations are free from
material structural defects. We further warrant to you that
the roof at the Eastern Winds and Pizza Hut Restaurants are
free of any defects in workmanship and material and we warrant
that we will make any reasonably necessary repairs to said
roofs required at any time within five years from the date of.
closing which arise as a direct result of defects in
workmanship or materials. We further warrant to you that the
roof at Commonwealth Square is free of any defects in
workmanship and material and we warrant that we will make any
reasonably necessary repairs to said roof required at any time
within one year from the date of closing which arise as a
direct result of defects in workmanship or materials. We will
perform all necessary repairs to the roof of the Post Office
building which are reasonably required to maintain a water
tight roof surface for a period of sixty seven months from the
date of closing at our sole cost and expense.
2.

Purchase Price

The purchase price for all of the foregoing property
is a total of $3,530,104.95. We will pay sales taxes directly
attributable to the sale of personal property sold to you
hereunder. The said purchase price is payable according to the
following terms and at the times indicated:
a.
$10,000 cash paid this date, to our
attorneys, Berman & Anderson, to be held in their
trust account.
b.
The sum of $242,000.00 to be paid at the
time of closing in cash funds (said amount to be
increased or reduced for any reduction or increase,
respectively, in the amount set forth in (e) hereafter
which occurs prior to closing or for prorations set
forth in paragraph 4 ) .
c.
The sum of $80,000 evidenced by a promissory
note payable to Stacey Properties in the form set
forth in Exhibit "CM attached hereto and by this
reference made a part hereof.
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d.
The sum of $2,900,000.00 paid to First
Security Bank in accordance with the terms of a loan
transaction set forth in detail in a letter from First
Security Bank of Utah to each of you dated March 27,
1984. First Security Bank will require and you agree
to execute a deed of trust.and promissory note in form
acceptable to the bank which said documents will be in
accordance with the terms of your separate agreement
with the bank dated March 27, 1984.
e.
Assumption of Post Office building mortgage
in the amount of approximately $298,104.95 to State
Savings and Loan Association which you will assume and
agree to pay.
3.

Conveyance

The properties shall be conveyed, an undivided
one-half interest to Dr. and Mrs. Goler and an undivided
one-half interest as part of a Section 1031 exchange
transaction involving Mr. and Mrs. Wixen and Val Ban Corp.,
each conveyance by a general warranty deed from the Sellers to
the grantees.
Mr. and Ms. Wixen shall have the right, without the
need of any further approval or consent of us prior to the
completion of the purchase of the subject property to transfer
and assign all of their rights and obligations under this
agreement to Val Ban Corp., a California corporation.
Val Ban Corp., pursuant to the contractual obligation
to purchase the subject property hereunder in accordance with
the terms and provisions of that certain agreement of exchange
entered into between Mr. and Ms. Wixen and Val Ban Corp. on
July 12, 1983, shall complete said purchase according to the
terms set forth in said agreement. Upon such assignment having
been made by Mr. and Ms. Wixen and upon our receipt of written
notice of the same, Mr. and Ms. Wixen shall have no further
rights, obligations, or liabilities hereunder, all such rights,
obligations and liabilities having been fully transferred and
assigned to Val Ban Corp. Upon the conveyance of the undivided
one-half interest in the properties from Val Ban Corp.-t,oMr. and Ms. Wixen, Val Ban Corp. shall be released by us from
its obligations under the promissory note (referred to in
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paragraph 2(c) above. provided that Mr. and Ms. Wixen assume
such promissory note obligation.
4.

Prorations and Closing Costs

The rents, taxes. insurance,, and utilities will be
prorated as of the date of closing and appropriate credits of
debits made to each of us. Taxes will be prorated on the basis
of 1983 property taxes with a final adjustment to be made in
November. 1984. at such time as the exact amount of 1984 taxes
is Known. It is contemplated that you will make similar
adjustments with First Security Bank of Utah relating to the
proration of rents. We will pay costs of recording deeds to
you and the loan fee to First Security Bank in the approximate
amount of $14,500. We and you will share equally the escrow
fee. Each of the parties hereto will bear their own attorney's
fees and costs for preparation of this agreement and in
connection with the closing.
5.

Leases

We heretofore delivered to you true, correct and
complete originals of all tenant leases pertaining to the
properties being sold to you. Such leases are valid and
binding documents and are in full force and effect. Except for
such leases, there are no other agreements in connection with
leasing of said property between us and such tenants with
respect to the properties. No party thereunder has any right,
with the giving of notice or lapse of tine or both, to
terminate any lease or assert any claim thereunder* except as
set forth in said leases. At the closing, we will by
instrument satisfactory to you transfer, convey and assign to
you all of our interest in said leases, including the right to
receive rents thereunder. Prior to the closing, we will obtain
for you letters from said tenants confirming the leases, and
prepaid rents and in addition we will prepare and execute a
joint letter advising the tenants of the transfer of ownership
to you and directing such tenants to pay rents to you. Such
transfer will not constitute a default under any of such
leases. We will resolve any differences asserted by said
tenants as it relates to prepaid rents or offsets claimed
against future rentals becoming due under the terms of the said
leases, and pay you for the amount of any such difference.
Prepaid rents and security deposits will be accounted for and
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paid to you at closing and you will be obligated for such
deposits in accordance with the terms of said leases.
6.

Personal Property

At the time of closing a bill of sale without
warranties evidencing the sale by us^to you'of'the equipment
and personal property locatfed^at'the^tfaffftetn WthdsRestaurant.
a comple€6fclist of which is set forth on Exhibit "D" attached
hereto, will be provided to you relating to such equipment and,
personal property.
7:

Preliminary Title Reports

We have delivered to you this date copies of
Preliminary Title Reports prepared by Rome Abstract Company
relating to the properties being sold, together with copies of
various documents which are referred to in the said title
reports. We represent and warrant that, except for those
matters explicitly described in such Preliminary Title Reports,
there are no liens, claims or encumbrances existing or which,
based on facts existing prior to the closing, may be asserted
against any of the properties. The proposed Section 1031
exchange transaction will be closed through Home Abstract
Company. An ALTA Owner's Extended Coverage Title Policy in the
amount of $3,530,104.9S will be provided to vou throuah Home
Abstract Company atf-oux ^xpentfef.
8.

Allocation of Values

The allocation of the purchase price or the respective
properties being sold by us to you will be set forth in a
Schedule approved by all parties at closing.
9.

Commissions

We have made arrangements to pay Century 21 Harmston
Realtors and Wixen Realty, a commission in the total amount of
$38,000 with Wixen Realty to receive 50\ thereof, in connection
with the sale and you are not responsible for payment of any
commission in connection with the subject transaction.
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10.

Warranties

At c l o s i n g we w i l l a s s i g n t o you a l l contract
warranties from third p a r t i e s p e r t a i n i n g to the s u b j e c t
p r o p e r t i e s as they r e l a t e t o any p e r s o n a l property, the
s t r u c t u r e s , or any component p a r t s t h e r e o f and we w i l l make a
reasonable e f f o r t t o n f o c a t e and d e l i v e r copies of a l l documents
i n our f i l e s with respetftr ttrereto. "TTft a d d i t i o n , we w i l l
delTver*to you at c l o s i n g a l l o r i g i n a l building c o n t r a c t s ,
p l a n s , permits, and other documents p e r t a i n i n g to the
p r o p e r t i e s purchased or the c o n s t r u c t i o n of same. We have
advised you most of the p r o p e r t i e s were constructed without
w r i t t e n building c o n t r a c t s .
11.

Possession

Possession of the properties being sold shall be
delivered at the date of closing.
12.

Closing Date

The closing date of this transaction and "closing" as
used herein shall be May 4, 1984, or as said date shall be
extended by mutual agreement between us. In the event said
closing does not occur on said date or on the date of extension
of the closing as mutually agreed to between us. each party
shall have all remedies provided for by law.
13.

Representations

We have previously represented to you and we hereby
affirm, to the best of our Knowledge and belief, that the
subject properties are in compliance with all applicable
building rules and regulations, and there are no violations of
any statutes or judicial orders pertaining to the subject
properties. The subject properties are in compliance with all
applicable zoning rules and regulations. There are no judicial
orders specifically pertaining to the subject properties. We
have provided you with copies of any special permits or
conditional use permits relating to operation of the subject
properties. There are no lawsuits, administrative proceedings,
arbitrations or other proceedings pertaining to the subject
properties or affecting such properties and to the best of our
knowledge none have been threatened and there are no
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governmental investigations relating thereto. In the event
suit is filed by any third party to enjoin closing of the
transaction or to rescind the sale transaction, ve will defend
said action at our sole cost and expense.
Stacey Properties is a Utah limited partnership which
has been duly formed and is validly existing under the lavs of
the State of Utah, and has all powers and authorities and all
material governmental licenses, authorizations, consents and
approvals required to carry on the business as now conducted by
it, to own the properties being sold hereunder, to enter into
this agreement, to execute and deliver the bill of sale, the
deeds and the assignments contemplated hereby and to perform
all of its obligations hereunder and thereunder. J. Ron Stacey
is the owner of the Commonwealth Square property. The
execution, delivery and performance by us of this agreement are
within our power, have been duly authorized by all necessary
action, require no action by or in respect of, or filing with,
any partner or any governmental body, agency or official or any
other party and do not contravene, or constitute a default
under, any provision of applicable law or regulation or of the
documents by which we were created and are governed or of any
agreement, judgment, injunction, order, decree or other
instrument binding upon us or result in the creation or
imposition of any lien, charge, encumbrance or security
interest on any of the properties being sold hereunder. We
have delivered to you true and complete copies of all of the
documents by which we were created and are governed which are
valid and binding and are in full force and effect. We have
not entered into any contract with any person to manage the
properties or operate any portion thereof.
14.

Termite Inspection

At the closing we will provide you with a standard
inspection certificate indicating no terminate infestation
issued by a recognized exterminator following inspection of the
properties sold hereunder.
15.

Survey

At the closing we will furnish to you surveys prepared
by a registered surveyor showing the properties being sold and
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the location of buildings thereon, the location of any streets,
rights of way, or rights of access.
16.

Conditions

(i) Your obligation to purchase the properties is
expressly conditioned upon the following:
a. That you obtain a loan from First Security
BanK of Utah in accordance with the terms set forth in
the letter from First Security to you dated March 27.
1984. or as said loan is amended or altered by mutual
agreement between you and the bank;
b.
That all representations and warranties made
by us shall be true and correct on and as of the date
of closing as if made on such date;
c.
That we shall have fully performed and
complied with all of the obligations to be performed
by us in this agreement;
d.
That you shall have received an opinion from
our attorneys. Berman & Anderson, in the form set
forth on Exhibit "EM hereto;
e.
That the assumption of the Post Office
building mortgage has been approved by State Savings
and Loan Association and the interest rate thereon
shall not exceed 11 1/2% per annum; and
f.
That there shall have been no material
adverse change in any of the properties or title
thereto since April 1. 1984.
(ii) Our obligation to sell the properties
is expressly conditioned upon the following:
(a) That First Security Bank release us from all of
our obligations and liabilities to said Bank;
(b) That you shall have fully performed and complied
with all of the obligations to be performed by you in this
agreement;
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(c) That J. Ron Stacey and Geraldine Stacey shall be
released from any liability to State Savings and Loan
Association arising in connection with the Post Office mortgage
being assumed by you.
17.

Indemnity

We agree to indemnify, defend and hold you harmless
and reimburse you on demand from and against, for, and with
respect to any claim, liability, obligation, loss, damage,
deficiency, assessment, judgment, cost or expense (including
without limitation reasonable attorneys1 fees and expenses, and
costs and expenses reasonably incurred, in investigating,
preparing or defending against any litigation or claim),
action, suit, proceeding or demand, of any kind or character,
arising out of or in any manner incident, relating or
attributable to:
or
in
or
by

a.
any breach or failure of any representation
warranty given by us contained in this agreement or
any certificate, instrument, assignment, conveyance
transfer, or other document or agreement executed
either of us in connection with this agreement;

b.
any failure of either of us to perform or
observe, or to have performed or observed, in full,
any covenant, agreement, or condition to be performed
or observed by us under this agreement or under any
certificate or other instrument, document or agreement
executed by us in connection with this agreement;
c.
the assertion by any person of any claim,
liability, obligation, agreement or undertaking which
relates to the properties or which in any manner
affects title to the properties which arises out of
any facts, transactions or circumstances occurring on
or prior to the closing date; or
d.
the enforcement of your rights under this
agreement.
18.

Survival.

The representations, warranties and covenants given by
us contained herein and the certificates delivered at the
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closing or otherwise delivered pursuant to this agreement,
shall survive the closing without regard to any investigation
made by you.
19.

Waiver and Modification.

This agreement may not be amended, modified,
superseded or cancelled, and none of the terms, covenants,
representations, warranties or conditions, may be waived except
by written instrument executed by all of us and for, or, in the
case of a waiver, by the party waiving compliance. Failure of
any party at any time or times to require strict performance of
any provision hereof shall not in any manner affect the right
of such party at a later date to enforce the same. No waiver
by any party of the breach of any term, covenant,
representation or warranty contained in this agreement as a
condition to such party's obligations hereunder, shall
constitute a release or affect any liability resulting from
said breach.
20.

Successors in Interest; Assignment.

This agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the
benefit of the successors and assigns of the parties. Except
as provided herein, no assignment of any rights and delegations
of any obligations for which provision is made in this
agreement may be made by any party without the prior written
consent of the other party.
If the foregoing sets forth the terms of our
understanding, please execute this agreement where set forth
below.
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^acepted and agreed to this
_Z^4_day pf April- 1984.

Ben Wixen

x>

~*~~

Wixen

MuJ
A/td

l^Lt+ViUxj

B e r n i e Goler

fo^ytyyvcL
Bonnie Goler

4066a
050184

Jb&j

Clark Waddoups, E s q . , 1*3975
Ronald G. Russell, Esq., #A4134
LARSEN, KIMBALL, PARR 4 CROCKETT
Attorneys for .Defendants and Counterclaimants
185 South State Street, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (301) 532-7840

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP WEBER COUNTY
STATE OP UTAH
STACEY PROPERTIES, a Utah
limited partnership.
Plaintiff,
vs.

PINDINGS OP PACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OP LAW

BEN WIXEN, FRANCINE WIXEN,
BERNIE GOLER AND BONNIE GOLER,
Defendants and
Counterclaimants,
vs.

;

J. RON STACEY,

]

Counterclaim

]

Defendant.

]

Civil No. 90743

This m a t t e r , having been t r i e d t o the Court on May 28,
2 9 , and 30, 1986, and p l a i n t i f f and J* Ron Stacey having been
represented by Robert K. Anderson and William P. Schwartz, and
defendants having been represented by Clark Waddoups and Ronald
G. R u s s e l l , and the Court, having heard the evidence and argument
of c o u n s e l , hereby makes the following f i n d i n g s and conclusions:

EXHIBIT "B"

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On

May

22,

1984,

plaintiff

Stacey

Properties,

counterclaim defendant J. Ron Stacey, and defendants Ben Wixen,
Francine Wixen, Bernie Goler, and Bonnie Goler entered into a
written agreement

(the "Agreement") whereby certain

properties

were sold by plaintiff and J. Ron Stacey to defendants, including
the main Ogden post office

located

in Ogden, Utah, and the

Commonwealth Square Shopping Center located in Sunset. Utah.
2.

As partial payment for the properties, defendants

executed an $80,000 promissory note dated Nay 22, 1984, payable
to plaintiff in monthly installments of $731.79, beginning on
June 1, 1984 (the "Note").
3.

Defendants paid to plaintiff $744.60 on August 1,

1984; and $731.79 on August 29, 1984.
4.

The Note contains a provision concerning offsets

which states:
Contemporaneous with Makers1 execution of
this Note, Makers, Properties and J. Ron Stacey
("Stacey") have executed a letter agreement
relating to the sale and purchase of certain
parcels of realty located in Davis and Weber
Counties, State of Utah. Pursuant to Section 17
of said letter agreement, Properties and Stacey
agree to indemnify, defend, and hold Makers
harmless and to reimburse Makers on demand from
and against, for, and with respect to inter alia,
any claim, liability or obligation relating ro
attributable to any breach of failure of any
representation or warranty given by Properties
and Stacey contained in the letter agreement
. . . . or any failure of either of

-2-

them to perform any covenant to be performed
under such agreement or any such instrument*
Makers shall have the right to offset against
any amounts due or to become due to
Properties under this Note any such
reimbursement due to Makers under Section 17
of said letter agreement or under any other
provision thereof . . ., provided, however,
that Makers give Properties written notice of
the amount to be offset and the specific
reasons therefor.
5.

On September 5, 1984, defendants sent written

notice to plaintiff asserting an offset against amounts due or to
become due under the Note for expenses incurred by defendants in
replacing an air-conditioning unit at the Ogden post office. The
amount and specific reasons for the offset were stated in that
letter.
6.

Defendants did not make the September, 1984

monthly payment under the Note and made no payments under the
Note after claiming said offset.

As of May 1, 1986, the total of

unpaid installments under the Note was $16,099.38.
7.

Plaintiff sent a letter to defendants on September

12, 1984 asserting that it was accelerating the entire balance
due and owing under the Note and further asserting that
defendants had failed to make payments in th-? time and manner
required by the Note.

The Note provides:

In the event this Note, or any obligation
provided to be satisfied or performed under
any agreement, instrument or document
connected with or related to this Note, now
existing or otherwise, is breached or is not
satisfied, performed or paid, at the time and
in the manner required, Properties, at its
option and without notice, may declare the
unpaid principal balance and accrued interest
immediately due and payable and makers agree
to immediately pay the same.

8.

The Agreement provides:

(Stacey Properties and J. Ron Stacey] agree
to remedy any latent defects in materials or
worHcnanship which arise within a one year
period from the date of closing, we
represent and warrant to you that all
heating, cooling, electrical, plumbing and
sewer systems at the properties are in
working order and will be operative at
closing . • . .,We will perfora all necessary
repairs to the roof of the Ogden post office
building which are reasonably required to
maintain a watertight roof surface for a
period of sixty-seven mpnths from the date of
closing at our sole cost and expense.
9.

At trial, defendants claimed offsets against th^

Note for the following items and amounts:

(a) Ogden Post Office Air
Conditioner Replacement

$25,063,.80

(b) Commonwealth Sewer Repair

$ 1,037,.83

(c) Ogden Post Office Roof

$43,750,.00

(d) Commonwealth Sidewalk Repair

$ 7,600,.00

(e) Commonwealth Electrical Repair

$ 1,409..70

(f)

Property Tax Adjustment

(g) Commonwealth Pire Sprinkler
10.

$ 3,028,.52
$ 1,190..00

Defendants provided plaintiff with written notice

of each claimed offset, which notice stated the amounts claimed
and reasons therefor*
11•

According to the evidence presented, the Court's

findings regarding the offsets claimed by defendants are as
follows:

a.

Post Office Air-Conditioning Unit,
(1)

The air-conditioning unitr according

to the circumstantial evidence presented, was
not in working order and was not operative on
May 22, 1984?
(2)

The air-conditioning unit had an

expected useful life of approximately fifteen
years;
(3)

On May 22, 1984, the unit would have

had approximately 25% of its useful life
remaining under normal conditions;
(4)

Plaintiff was notified by Eugene

Perren of the post office by at least May 29,
1984 that the air-conditioning unit was not
operable.

Plaintiff and J. Ron Stacey failed

to make repairs to the unit after receiving
notice from the post office that the unit was
inoperable;
(5)

Defendants incurred a total expense

of $22,758.00 to replace the air-conditioning
unit, the first installment of which in the
amount of $6,000 was paid on August 21, 1984.
b.

Commonwealth Square Sewer System.
(1)

Defendants discovered a lS'-lS" gap

in a sewer pipe at Commonwealth Square within
one year of Kay 22, 1984, which gap was never
remedied by plaintiff or J. Ron Stacey.

(2)

The subject gap was not discovered

prior to closing and could not have been
discovered by a reasonable inspection due to
its nature and location;
(3)

Defendants incurred an expense of

$1,037.83 to repair said gap.
c.

Ogden Post Office Roof.
(1)

The Ogden .post office roof has

leaked on numerous occasions following
closing and plaintiff and J. Ron Stacey have
failed to perform all necessary repairs which
were reasonably required to maintain a
watertight roof surface;
(2)

According to the evidence presented

by defendants, the cost of replacing the post
office roof with a new "twenty year" roof
would be $49,000;
(3)

The age of the roof at the date of

closing was approximately twelve years;
(4)

Defendants have not incurred any

out-of-pocket expenses

to repair said roof as

of the time of trial.
d.

Commonwealth Square Sidewalk.
(1)

The sidewalks at Commonwealth Square

are currently in a defective condition in
several places;

(2) The defects were discoverable by
defendants prior to May 22, 1984?
e.

Commonwealth Electrical System.,
(1)

Defendants failed to prove by a

preponderance of evidence that the
Commonwealth electrical system was not in
working order at the date of closing.
f•

Property Tax Adjustment.
(1)

Defendants failed to prove by a

preponderance of evidence that plaintiff owed
defendants additional amounts pursuant to the
parties1 agreement to adjust the property
taxes payable by the parties according to the
actual 1984 tax assessment.
(2)

Plaintiff moved at the start of

trial to amend its Complaint to include a
claim for the property tax proration owed
plaintiff by defendants, which motion was
granted.
(3) Defendants have failed to make
payment to plaintiff of $958.10 for which the
tenants at Commonwealth were responsible and
for which plaintiff claimed a pro-rata
credit.
g.

Commonwealth Fire Sprinkling System.
(1) Defendants failed to present any

evidence that the fire sprinkling system at

Commonwealth Square was not in working order
at the date of closing,
12.

These Findings of Fact shall be construed to be

Conclusions of Law to the extent that same may be found to
constitute Conclusions of Law.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
13.

The Court makes the following conclusions with

respect to each of the claimed offsets:
a.

Post Office Air-Conditioning Unit.
(1) The east air-conditioning unit at

the Ogden post office was not in working
order and operative on May 22, 1984 in breach
of the terms of the Agreement;
(2) Defendants would receive a windfall
if plaintiff and J. Ron Stacey were held
responsible for the entire cost of
replacement;
(3) Defendants are entitled to offset
against amounts due or to become due under
the Note the amount of $5,689.50, which is
25% of the total replacement cost of the air
conditioner incurred by defendants, together
with prejudgment interest on that amount at
12% per annum from August 21, 1984 to May 30,
1986 or $1,209.89.

_ Q .

b.

Commonwealth Sewer System.
(1)

A latent defect in the sewer system

at Commonwealth Square Shopping Center arose
within one year from May 22, 1984, which
defect plaintiff and J. Ron Stacey failed to
remedy in breach of the terns of the
Agreement.
(2)

Defendants.are entitled to offset

against amounts due or to become due under
the Note the amount of $1,037.83 for costs
incurred by defendants to repair said sewer
system, together with pre-judgment interest
on that amount from January lf 1985 to May
30, 1986 or $175.72.
c.

Qgden Post Office Roof.
(1)

Plaintiff and J. Ron Stacey have

failed to perform all necessary repairs which
were reasonably required to maintain the
Ogden post office roof in a watertight
condition in breach of the terms of the
Agreement?
(2)

Defendants would receive a windfall

if plaintiff and J. Ron Stacey were held
responsible for the entire cost of a new
roof;
(3)

Defendants are entitled to recover

against plaintiff and J. Ron Stacey an award

of damages proximately resulting from said breach
in cne amount of $12f 250, which is 25% of the
cost of a new " twenty-year" roof;
(4) Because

defendants had

incurred no

out-of-pocket expenses with respect to said roof
prior to trial, no offset against the Note arose
under Paragraph 17 of the Agreement and the Note.
(5) Plaintiff and J, Ron Stacey shall have no
further

obligations

under

the

Agreement

with

respect to the Ogden post office roof from and
after May 30, 1986*
d.

Commonwealth Square Sidewalk.
(1) The defects claimed by defendants with

respect

to

the

Commonwealth

Square

Shopping

Center were not latent defects within the terms
of the agreement!
(2) Defendants are not entitled to any award
with respect to said sidewalks.
e.

Commonwealth Electrical System.
(1) The defendants have failed to prove by a

preponderance of evidence that the Commonwealth
electrical system was not in working order on Hay
22, 1984.
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(2)

Defendants are not entitled to any

award with respect to said electrical system.
f.

Property Tax Adjustment.
(1)

Pursuant to the Agreement, plaintiff

and J. Ron Stacey are entitled to recover
$958.10 from defendants jointly and
severally, together with prejudgment interest
at the rate of 12% per annum from January 1,
1985 to May 30, 1986 in the amount of
$162.22, as a pro-rata credit for property
taxes which were paid or should have been
paid to defendants by certain tenants.
(2)

Defendants are not entitled to any

award with respect to property taxes.
g.

Commonwealth Fire Sprinkling System.
(1)

Defendants presented no evidence

that the Commonwealth fire sprinkling system
was not in working order at the date of
closing.
(2) Defendants are not entitled to any
award with respect to said system.
14.

The time at which a default justifying

acceleration is measured is at the time of the attempted
acceleration.

No default had occurred on September 12, 1984

justifying acceleration and the attempted acceleration by
plaintiff was of no effect.

15*

Plaintiff was not entitled to accelerate the Note

at the time the complaint was filed because the payments made by
the defendants to replace the subject air conditioner exceeded
amounts due under the Note on that date.
16*

Acceleration is a harsh remedy and the plaintiff

is not entitled to acceleration as of the date of trial for the
additional reason that acceleration should not be dependent upon
the uncertainties of delays in bringing a case to trial.
17.

Because defendants are entitled to a money

judgment with respect to damages awarded for breach of the
agreement to maintain the post office roof, acceleration of the
Note at this time would be inappropriate.
18.

The total amount awarded to defendants, including

prejudgment interest, is to be offset against the cumulative
monthly installments under the Note of §16,099.38 (as of May 1,
1986) and against future installments under the Note until such
amount has been fully satisfied.
19.

Pursuant to stipulation, defendants1 Fourth

Counterclaim shall be dismissed with prejudice.
20.

Plaintiff did not prevail on its complaint for

acceleration and is therefore not entitled to an award of
attorney^ fees.
21.

The defendants would be entitled to an award of

attorney1s fees if they had simply defended the case
successfully, but are not entitled to an award of fees because
they did not prevail on many of their counterclaims.
22.

All parties shall bear their own costs.

23.

These Conclusions of Law shall be construed to be

Findings of Fact to the extent that the same may be found to
'^r^\jj-

constitute FinSings of Fact.
DATED this /*>

day of Ju^-trtrt, 1986.
BY THE COURT:

'*aage David B. Roth
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Robert M. Anderson of
Hansen and Anderson
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and J, Ron Stacj

RoHci/ld G. Ru&SelJ^of
Lar/en, Kimball, Parr & Crockett
Attorneys for Defendants
and Counterclaimaints

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 18th day of August 1986, a
true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was hand-delivered to:
Robert M. Anderson, Esq*
William P. Schwartz, Esq.
HANSEN & ANDERSON
Valley Tower Building
50 West Broadway, Sixth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

May 25, 1984

The Undersign hereby agrees to be liable as co-makers of that certain Promisory
Note, as said Note as been modified by interlineations and additions previously
agreed to by Val Ban Corp., Bernie and Bonnie Goler.
A photo copy of said Note ( reflecting such modification Is attached hereto as
Ehiblt "A".

^uiAAjyPfJt
Francine A. Wlxen

^CJI^QAJ

EXHIBIT "A"

PROMISSORY NOTE
$80,000.00

Salt Lake City, Utah
May 2Jr 1984

FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned ("Makers'*) promise
to pay to the order of STACEY PROPERTIES, a Utah limited
partnership ("Properties"), or its assigns, the principal sum of
Eighty Thousand Dollars ($80,000.00), together with interest on
said principal sum, or the unpaid balance thereof, from and after
the date hereof, at the rate of ten and one-half percent (10
1/2Z) per annum. Principal and interest shall be paid in monthly
installments of $731.79 each, payable on the first day of each
month commencing June 1, 1984. Payments shall be applied first
to accrued interest with the remainder applied to principal. The
entire principal balance and all accrued interest shall be due
and payable on the 1st day of May, 1994.
Contemporaneous with Makers9 execution of this Note,
Makers, Properties and J. Ron Stacey ("Stacey") have executed a
letter agreement relating to the sale and purchase of certain
parcels of realty located in Davis and Weber Counties, State of
Utah. Pursuant to Section 17 of said letter agreement,
Properties and Stacey agree to indemnify, defend and hold Makers
harmless and to reimburse Makers on demand*from and against, for,
and with respect to, inter alia, any claim, liability or
obligation relating or attributable to any breach or failure of
any representation or warranty given by Properties and Stacey
contained in the letter agreement or any instrument executed by
either of them in connection therewith or any failure of either
of them to perform any covenant to be performed under such
agreement or any such instrument. Makers shall have the right to
offset against any amounts due or to become due to Properties
under this Note any such reimbursement due to Makers under
Section 17 of said letter agreement or under any other provision
thereof or of any document executed in conjunction therewith,
provided, however, that Makers give Properties written notice of
the amount to be offset and the specific reasons therefor.
In the event this Note, or any obligation provided to
be satisfied or performed under any agreement, instrument or
document connected with or related to this Note, now existing or
otherwise, is breached or is not satisfied, performed or paid, at
the time and in the'manner required, Properties, at its option
and without rtbtice, may declare the unpaid principal balance and
accrued interest immediately due. and payable and Makers agree to
immediately pay the same. Makers agree to pay any and all costs
and expenses (regardless of the particular nature thereof and

J & J ^ ^ - ^ . W ^ W P o r t l a w of ^he Center to*Tensnts far
purposes afjtaupancyT-ylenants
whether j*incurre<i with ©r^without .suit or before or 'after
judgment .^including 'reasonable' Attorneys' -:fees ) which "may bo
incurred by or in connection'with the enforcement or performance
of any of the "rights of Properties hereunder or under any
agreement,'instrument or document connected with or related to
this Hots. If principal or interest owing hereunder are not paid
when due , 'interest shall thereafter accrue on the unpaid
principal balance at the rate of eighteen percent (18X) per
annum, both before and after Judgment. The entire balanee of
principal and interest owing hereunder, shsll mature and be
payable in the event of sale or transfer by Makers of all or any
portion of the Commonwealth Square Shopping Center located in
Sunset, Utah (-the Center-), provided, however, that (\)»j6h/e/

A

AIL/,,.

/lOftrC

&/#&//&&&•
(2) t h # transfer of all or any portion of the
Center to a corporation, partnership or other entity which is
controlled by Makers or sny one of them or a lineal descendant kV
*tt4Wfcr/of Makers or any one of them, or* (3) the transfer to a
spouse,lineal descendant ui enueeuir of a Maker or to a trust
naming a Maker or a spouse prlineal descendant AV/AAW$XAV of a
Maker as a beneficiary, "shall not be deemed to accelerate the
maturity date for payment of principal and interest owing
hereunder.' The term "control** means ownership of more than/rrf£^one hundr
percent £X0X) of the capital of a partnership or unincorporated
/lrs////
entity or^Oie ownership of more than fifrV percent (JjOZ) of all MI*/(Al
classes of stock of a corporation.
one hunSred
1001
^
Presentment for payment, protest and notice of protest
and of non-payment of this Note are hereby waived.
In the event Properties determines that it will sell or
discount this Note, end if Makers are not then in default
hereunder, then Properties shall offer the right to Makers to
purchase this Note on the same terms set forth in said offer.
This Note is executed din connection with and pursuant
to the terms of the letter agreement above-mentioned and certain
ether written agreements entered into between Makers, Properties
and Stacey, and the terms thereof are hereby incorporated into
and by reference made a part of this Note.

«» «± « * » » c * m*r, a

« £ £ £ & • c * 1 " orai4

nit 18 in the Center (provided, however,,, ^ , ,
„,
/O /
Hat Makers shall pay Properties $10,0001>Y cS&CQ.*' h~*-**>
t the closing of such sale if, but only if,
te price for such Unit 18 equals or
xceeds $120,000)

£/t*r
"

, ,
r**f*.

•the leasing of &purposes of occur

and all portions of the /
~y by Tenants,
^"

iter to Tenants for

whether incurred with or without suit or before or after
judgment, including reasonable attorneys1 fees) which may be
incurred by or in connection with the enforcement or performance
of any of the rights of Properties hereunder or under any
agreement, instrument or document connected with or related to
this Note* If principal or interest owing hereunder are not paid
when duei interest shall thereafter accrue on the unpaid
principal balance at the rate of eighteen percent (18X) per
annum, both before and after judgment. The entire balance of
principal and interest owing hereunder shall mature and be
payable in the event of sale or transfer by Makers of all or any
portion of the Commonwealth Square Shopping Center located in
J
Sunset, Utah ("the Center"), provided, however, that (l)*tJv*
£*y
tgenafeg ef leasehold interests by Mahegs ef all eg any pegfcien
of the Cent*r, (2) the transfer of all or any portion of the
Center to a corporation, partnership or other entity which is.
controlled by Makers or any one of them or a lineal descendant <er
ancQCter of Makers or any one of them, +# (3) the transfer to a
spouse^ lineal descendant eg ancestor of a Maker or to a trust
naming a Maker or a spous%rf/ lineal descendant mw ansestor of a
Maker as a beneficiary**shall not be deemed to accelerate the
maturity date for payment of principal and interest owing
hereunder* The term "control" means ownership of more than fifteyone' hi
percent (W3rj*or*the capital of a partnership or unincorporated
entity or the ownership of more than/fiicy percent (W9) of all 2*^
classes of stock of a corporation, one hundred
100%
(j
Presentment for payment, protest and notice of protest
and of non-payment of this Note are hereby waived.
In the event Properties determines that it will sell or
discount this Note, and if Makers are not then in default
hereunder,, then Properties shall offer the right to Makers to
purchase this Note on the same terms set forth in said offer.
This Note is executed in connection with and pursuant
to the terms of the letter agreement above-mentioned and certain
other written agreements entered into between Makers, Properties
and Stacey, and the terms thereof are hereby incorporated into
and by reference made a part of this Note.
VAL BAN CORP., a California

**the sale or transfer by Makers of Unit 18 in the Center (provided,
however, that Makers shall pay Properties $10,000.00 at the closm.

Bernie G

o

Bonnie Goler
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Clark Waddoups, Esq., #A3975
Ronald G. Russell, Esq., #A4134
LARSEN, KIMBALL, PARR 6 CROCKETT
Attorneys for pefendants and Counterclaimants
185 South State Street, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7840

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP WEBER COUNTY
STATE OP UTAH
STACEY PROPERTIES, a Utah
limited partnership.
Plaintiff,

vs.
BEN WIXEN, PRANCINE WIXEN,
BERNIE GOLBR AND BONNIE GOLER,

\

Defendants and
Counterclaimants,

JUDGMENT

Civil No. 90743

vs.
J. RON STACEY,
Counterclaim
Defendant.

]
j

This matter having been tried to the Court on Nay 28,
29, and 30, 1986, the Honorable David Roth presiding, and
Findings of Pact and Conclusion of Lav having been duly entered,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AMD DECREED as follows:
1.

That plaintiff Stacey Properties and J* Ron Stacey

do recover from defendants and counterclaimants Ben Wixen,
Prancine Wixen, Bernie Goler, and Bonnie Goler, the total sum of
$1,120.32, which sum includes prejudgment interest accrued prior
EXHIBIT M D M

to May 30, 1986, together with interest thereon at the rate of
12% per annum from May 30, 1986 until paid;
2.

That said defendants and counterclaimants do

recover on their counterclaims from Stacey Properties and J. Ron
Stacey the total sum of $20,362.94, which sum includes
prejudgment interest accrued prior to May 30, 1986, together with
interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum from May 30, 1986
until paid;
3.

That the foregoing amount awarded to defendants and

counterclaimants is hereby ordered offset against the cumulative
monthly installments of $16,099.38 which are due as of May 1,
1986 under that certain Promissory Note dated May 22, 1984 and
payable to plaintiff (the "Note") and the remainder of such award
is to be offset against future installments under the Note until
such amount has been fully satisfied;
4.

That plaintiff's claim herein for acceleration of

the Note is dismissed with prejudice, no cause of action;
5.

That plaintiff and J. Ron Stacey are released from

any further obligation to maintain or repair the Ogden post
office roof from and after May 30, 1986;
6.

That defendants1 and counterclaimants1 Fourth

Counterclaim is dismissed with prejudice, no cause of action; and
7.

That none of the parties are awarded attorney's

fees and all parties shall bear their own, costs.
DATED this /J>

day of Ju»$uofe> 1986.
BY THE C5

V j u f r j ^ D a v i d E. Roth

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Robert M. Anderson of
Hansen and Anderson
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and J. Ron Stacey

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 18th day of August, 1986,
a true and correct copy of the foregoing JODGMENT was
hand-delivered to:
Robert M. Anderson, Esq*
William P. Schwartz, Esq.
HANSEN & ANDERSON
Valley Tower Building
50 West Broadway, Sixth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Stacey Properties, a Utah
limited partnership,

)
)

Plaintiff, Appellant,
and Cross-Respondent,

)
)
)

v#

OPINION
(For Publication)

Case No. 880127-CA

Ben Wixen, Francine Wixen,
Bernie Goler, and Bonnie Goler,
Defendants, Respondents,
and Cross-Appellants.

w

Before Judges Garff, Bench, and Jackson.

BENCH, Judge:
Plaintiff appeals from final judgment on an action to
accelerate the balance due on a promissory note. Defendants
appeal from final judgment on their counterclaim for breaches
of warranty and contract. There are three issues presented for
review. First, did the trial court err in dismissing
plaintiffs claim for acceleration of the balance owed on the
promissory note? Second, did the court err in measuring
damages to be awarded defendants on their counterclaim? Third,
did the court err in failing to award attorney fees? We affirm
in part, reverse in part, and remand.
This dispute stems from the sale in May 1984 of several
commercial properties located in and around Ogden, Utah.
Stacey Properties Ltd. (Stacey), a Utah limited partnership,
and J. Ron Stacey, general partner, sold the properties to
defendants Ben and Francine Wixen and Bernie and Bonnie Goler,
general partners of Golwix Properties (Golwix). The total
purchase price exceeded $3.5 million, most of which was paid
through Golwix's assumption of existing debt. Golwix also
executed a promissory note in the amount of $80,000 payable in
monthly installments to Stacey.
The terms of the promissory note included an offset
provision, an acceleration clause, and a provision for Stacey*s
attorney fees in the event enforcement of the note became
necessary. In conjunction with the note, a letter agreement
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memorializing the terms of the sale provided for, inter alia,
express warranties on certain aspects of the properties and for
Golwix's attorney fees for any breach of those warranties.
The note and agreement were executed on May 22, 1984. On
September 5, 1984, Golwix asserted an offset against payments
due under the note. A week later, Stacey notified Golwix that
the entire balance due under the note was being accelerated
because of Golwix*s -default.- Stacey filed suit on December
5, 1984, and Golwix counterclaimed.
Trial before the court commenced on May 28/ 1986. After
three days of testimony, the trial court determined that Golwix
had failed to make a total of $16,099.38 in payments on the
note by the time of trial. The court further determined that
Golwix had established offsets totaling $6,727.33 for
replacement of an air conditioner and repair of a sewer
system. Golwix was also awarded $12,250 in damages on its
counterclaim for replacement of a roof. The trial court found
that there had been no default and denied Stacey*s demand to
accelerate the balance due on the note. Neither party was
found to be entitled to an award of attorney fees. Both
parties appeal the judgment.
ACCELERATION OF THE PROMISSORY NOTE
Although an acceleration clause Hwill be enforced in
accordance with the agreement of the parties,- KIXX, Inc. v.
Stallion Music, Inc., 610 P.2d 1385, 1388 (Utah 1980), the
remedy is a harsh one "not favored in the law." Williamson v.
Wanlass, 545 P.2d 1145, 1147 (Utah 1976).
Stacey contends on appeal that it should have been
permitted to accelerate the due date of the principal balance
of the promissory note according to the note's terms. The
pertinent provision of the note states:
In the event this Note, or any obligation
provided to be satisfied or performed under
any agreement, instrument or document
connected with or related to this Note, now
existing or otherwise, is breached or is not
satisfied, performed or paid, at the time and
in the manner required, [Stacey], at its
option and without notice, may declare the
unpaid principal balance and accrued interest
immediately due and payable and [Golwix]
agree[s] to immediately pay the same.
We examine this provision as we would a contract, since
[p]romissory notes . . . are contracts between the parties,
and the rules of construction applicable to contracts apply to
them.w First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Lvgrisse, 647 P.2d 1268,
w
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1272 (Kan. 1982). Furthermore, *[t]he interpretation of
contract language presents us with a question of law on which
we need not defer to the trial court's construction but are
free to render our independent interpretation.- Faulkner v.
Farnsworth, 714 P.2d 1149, 1150 (Utah 1986); see also Ted R.
Brown & Assoc, Inc. v. Carnes Corp., 753 P.2d 964, 968 (Utah
App. 1988).
Stacey claims on appeal that the ruling below discourages
unsecured loans, creates a precedent opposed to the policy of
prompt notification of default, and weakens the enforceability
of acceleration provisions in general. We disagree. The
essence of the ruling of the trial court is merely that
acceleration was premature at the time of notification and
unwarranted later because of the amount of Golwixfs offset.
At the time Golwix notified Stacey of its offset claim, two
of the four monthly installment payments due had been paid.
There is testimony in the record that the parties had agreed to
postpone payment of the initial monthly installment for one
year. The remaining unpaid installment was due on September 1,
1984, four days before Golwix sent notification of its offset.
Prior to submission of its offset claim, Golwix had already
paid or deferred three of the four installment payments due.
On those facts, the court could reasonably find that no default
had occurred at the time of the attempted acceleration.
The court also found that acceleration was unwarranted
because the amount of offsets asserted by Golwix exceeded the
amount in arrears on the note. It is clear from the record
that Golwix bargained for and received a contractual right of
offset* The operative provision of the promissory note states:
[Golwix] shall have the right to offset
against any amounts due or to become due to
[Stacey] under this Note any such
reimbursement due to [Golwix] under Section
17 of said letter agreement or under any
other provision thereof or of any document
executed in conjunction therewith, provided,
however, that [Golwix] give[s] [Stacey]
written notice of the amount to be offset
and the specific reasons therefor.
The trial court considered this provision along with the
following provision of the letter agreement:
The properties have been inspected by
[Golwix] and are purchased "as is" . . . .
[Stacey] agree[s] to remedy any latent
defects in materials or workmanship which
arise within a one year period from the date
of closing. We represent and warrant to you
that all heating, cooling, electrical,
880127-CA
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plumbing and sewer systems at the properties
are in working order and will be operative
at closing and that the footings and
foundations are free from material
structural defects. . . . We will perform
all necessary repairs to the roof of the
Post Office building which are reasonablyrequired to maintain a water tight roof
surface for a period of sixty seven [sic]
months from the date of closing at our sole
cost and expense.
When Golwix incurred a $22,758 expense to replace an air
conditioner, it referred to the warranty provision of the
letter agreement and exercised its contractual offset right
under the promissory note. These two instruments could be
reasonably construed together. Verhoef v. Aston, 740 P.2d
1342, 1344 (Utah App. 1987) (agreements which are related and
executed contemporaneously must be construed as a whole and
harmonizesd) . The trial court could also properly balance the
acceleration and offset terms of the note, giving effect to
each of the provisions of the entire agreement. Minshew v.
Chevron Oil Co., 575 P.2d 192, 194 (Utah 1978) (contractual
provisions must be interpreted in light of the entire
agreement, giving effect to every other provision). We
conclude that the trial court was legally correct in holding
that acceleration was unwarranted because the offset exceeded
the total payments due on the note. See, e.g., Wells v. Cobb,
455 So.2d 1069 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (acceleration was
improper where default had not occurred due to offset).
Accordingly, acceleration was unwarranted prior to trial, and
we affirm the ruling of the trial court.•*•
MEASURE OF DAMAGES ON COUNTERCLAIM
Stacey argues that the trial court erred in measuring
damages to be awarded Golwix on its counterclaim. Much of the
trial record is devoted to establishing the timing, cost, and
extent of repairs needed on the various sale properties. Based
on the factual findings, the trial court determined as a matter
of law that Stacey was liable on only three of Golwix•s claimed
offsets. The court found that: 1) Stacey had breached its
contract to maintain a watertight roof at the post office
property; 2) Stacey had breached its warranty that the cooling
system at the post office was to be operative on the closing
date; and 3) Stacey had breached its warranty to remedy any
latent defects in materials or workmanship by failing to remedy
a defect in the sewer system at the shopping center property.
1. We need not reach the issue as to whether acceleration was
warranted at the time of trial since the court's award to Golwix
still exceeded the amount in arrears on the note even at that
time.
880127-CA
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Although the court awarded a dollar-for-dollar reimbursement of
the sewer repairs, the replacement costs for the roof and air
conditioner were apportioned 25% to Stacey and 75% to Golwix.
This apportionment is at issue on appeal.
Damages recoverable in a breach of contract action are
generally -those which arise naturally from the breach and
which reasonably may be supposed to have been within the
contemplation of the parties or are reasonably foreseeable.Robbins v. Finlav, 645 P.2d 623, 625 (Utah 1982).2 -Damages
are properly measured by the amount necessary to place the
nonbreaching party in as good a position as if the contract had
been performed.- Alexander v. Brown, 646 P.2d 692, 695 (Utah
1982).
A review of the amounts awarded to Golwix for the roof
leads us to conclude that this rule was properly applied. The
trial court's apportionment of the costs for roof replacement
was based on evidence in the record that a new twenty-year roof
would cost $49,000. Since Stacey had contracted to maintain
the roof for approximately five years, the court reasonably
found that Stacey should bear the cost of five years of a
twenty-year roof, i.e., 25% of $49,000, or $12,250.
The trial court likewise apportioned the actual replacement
cost of the air conditioner. Golwix was awarded 25% of the
replacement cost of $22,758, or $5,689.50. The court held that
Golwix would "receive a windfall- if Stacey was held
responsible for the full replacement cost. The award, however,
fails to -place the nonbreaching party in as good a position as
if the contract had been performed.- Alexander, 646 P.2d at
695. Golwix contracted for a cooling system that was to be
operable on the day of closing. What it received was an air
conditioner that was not in working order on that date. Since
the evidence indicates that the reasonable cost of repairing
the unit would have been between $19,000 and $20,000, the
court's award was insufficient to afford Golwix the benefit of
its bargain. For that reason, the award for the air
conditioner should be increased, on remand, to reflect the
reasonable cost of repair.
ATTORNEY FEES
Both parties sought, and were denied, attorney fees under
provisions of the promissory note and letter agreement. Stacey
based its claim for attorney fees on the following provision of
the promissory note:
2. We do not distinguish the breach of warranty claim from the
breach of contract claim as M[a]n action for breach of warranty
may sound in either contract or tort.- Mitchell v. Pearson
Enterprises, 697 P.2d 240, 247 (Utah 1985).
880127-CA
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[Golwix] agree[s] to pay any and all costs
and expenses (regardless of the particular
nature thereof and whether incurred with or
without suit or before or after judgment,
including reasonable attorneys' fees) which
may be incurred by or in connection with the
enforcement or performance of any of the
rights of [Stacey] hereunder or under any
agreement/ instrument or document connected
with or related to this Note.
Golwix based its claim for fees on the following provision
of the letter agreement:
[Stacey] agree[s] to indemnify . . . and
reimburse you . . . for . . . any claim
. . . (including without limitation
reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses/ and
costs and expenses reasonably incurred, in
investigating, preparing or defending
against any litigation or claim)/ . . .
arising out of or in any manner incident/
relating or attributable to: a. any breach
or failure of any representation or warranty
given by us . . . ; b. any failure of
either of us to perform or observe . . . any
covenant/ agreement, or condition to be
performed or observed by us under this
agreement or under any . . . other
instrument . . . executed by us in
connection with this agreement; . . . or
d. the enforcement of your rights under this
agreement.
As a general rule, attorney fees may be recovered in Utah
only if provided for by statute or contract. Cooper v. Deseret
Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 757 P.2d 483/ 486 (Utah
App. 1988).
If attorney fees are recoverable by contract, M[a] party is
entitled only to those fees attributable to the successful
vindication of contractual rights within the terms of [the]
agreement.- Travner v. Cushing, 688 P.2d 856, 858 (Utah 1984).
The court below found that Stacey was not entitled to an
award of attorney fees because it did not prevail on its
complaint for acceleration. We consider this finding to be in
accord with the language of the note, i.e./ Golwix will pay
attorney fees in connection with the enforcement of Stacey's
rights under the note. Since Stacey's attempt to accelerate
the note was unsuccessful/ Stacey was properly denied its
attorney fees.
In regards to Golwix's claim for attorney fees, the trial
court found that it was "not entitled to an award of fees
because [it] did not prevail on many of [its] counterclaims."
880127-CA
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The letter agreement provides, however, for the reimbursement
of Golwixfs attorney fees incurred in enforcing any claims for
breach of warranty or failure of performance. The contractual
provision is expansively written, encompassing a broad range of
potential expenses connected with rights arising under the
contract. The mere fact that Golwix failed to prevail on some
of their counterclaims does not justify a withholding of fees
to which they were contractually entitled. "Provisions in
written contracts providing for payment of attorney fees should
ordinarily be honored by the courts." Soffe v. Ridd, 659 P.2d
1082, 1085 (Utah 1983). Golwix was not only successful in its
opposition to acceleration of the note, it was also successful
on some of its counterclaims. Therefore, even with partial
success, Golwix was entitled to attorney fees for the claims on
which it was successful. See Travner, 688 P.2d at 858 (each
party was entitled to attorney fees where each was partially
successful). We conclude that the trial court abused its
discretion in failing to give effect to the broad contractual
language and partial success of Golwix in enforcing its
contractual rights.
The decision of the trial court is affirmed in part and
reversed in part. The case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion. Costs are awarded to Golwix.

Russell W. Bench, Judge

Norman H. Jackson,^uudge
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This cause having been heretofore argued and submitted, and the
Court being sufficiently advised in the premises, it is now
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in part. The case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion. Costs are awarded to Golwix.
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